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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 323 
Accident time: 12:50 Accident Date: 30/05/2001 
Where it occurred: Rasa Koshare 
minefield No.358 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 11/06/2001 
ID original source: TG/CC/JF No 
006/2001 
Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
electromagnetic 
woodland 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR 34T DN 3503 0246 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 





The following is the MACC accident report, edited for anonymity. 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) Standard Working 
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Wednesday 
30 May 2001 for an accident Investigation Board of Inquiry.  Annex A details the Convening 
Order. 
 
This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that occurred on 
Wednesday 30 May 2001.  Based on the investigation, interviews, statements from the 
demining NGOs (a collaboration between two NGOs) personnel involved in the accident, 
visits and photos of the accident site, this mine accident is considered to be preventable. 
This finding is based on the fact that an International Supervisor had conducted improper 
clearance procedures whilst conducting a level two survey.  This clearance was not in 
accordance with the demining NGO’s SOPs or to a recognised standard.  The deminer [the 
victim] was permitted to enter this area without personal protective equipment and was 
therefore placed in a dangerous situation that ultimately led to him stepping on a PMA-3 mine 
and sustaining injuries. Not withstanding the fact that the deminer should not have been 
permitted to enter this area, his injuries would have been significantly reduced had he been 
wearing personal safety equipment. 
 
The accident occurred at one of the Rasa Koshare minefield’s, Task Dossier Number W02-
37, minefield number 358, GR 34T DN 3503 0246 on 30 May 2001 at 12:50. 
 
Events leading up to the Accident 
The demining NGO have been conducting clearance operations in the Koshare area since 
March of this year. This organisation has had resounding success in locating and clearing a 
large proportion of the minefields in the Koshare area. The terrain is very difficult with thick 
vegetation and the density of mines is high. The strategy employed by the demining NGO to 
employ a survey capacity to locate and identify the minefields and then the actual mine rows 
has been effective.  It has allowed the demining teams to move into a minefield and conduct 
clearance immediately without having to waste time searching for the mine rows. 
The demining NGO have one Level Two Survey Team conducting operations at minefield 
number 358.  According to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ) record for this minefield, there are two 
rows of mines that contain PMR-2A fragmentation mines and PMA-3 blast mines as keepers.  
This minefield is bisected by a dirt road that has been utilised as a base lane for both rows on 
either side of the road.  
 
An International Supervisor for the demining NGO worked alone in mine rows on the East of 
the road, and the West side of the road was worked in by the remainder of the survey team. 
Due to the complexity of the mine rows on the Eastern side it was decided by the demining 
NGO Operations Manager to employ the International Supervisor to locate and then identify 
the pattern of the two mine rows. The International Supervisor was the only person up until 
the accident to have conducted clearance and walked in this area. He had located the two 
mine rows and was able to determine the pattern on his side of the road. The mine clusters 
he had located contained one PMR-2 mine and two PMA-3 keepers in these two rows. One of 
these clusters was in very close proximity to the mine that the victim stepped on. The two 
PMA-3 mines in this particular cluster that the International Supervisor had located were not 
armed. 
 
The method the International Supervisor employed to locate the mine rows and then identify 
the pattern of the mines was not in accordance with the demining NGO SOPs or to a 
recognised standard. He did not use a base stick to clear, and therefore the width of 
clearance lane was not to the full 100cm width with the 10cm safety overlap either side. He 
was not using a metal detector as all minefields in this task dossier are cleared by excavation 
due to the very high metal content in the soil. Therefore he was conducting excavation and 
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prodding drills to clear, however as he was not using a base stick, the reliability and 
consistency of this clearance was questionable. 
The International Supervisor was about to conduct marking in his area and he called the 
Survey Section Leader and enquired if there were marking sticks at his site. The SL then sent 
one of the deminers, [the victim] down to the International Supervisor’s location with the 
marking sticks.  The International Supervisor met the victim up on the road and it was his 
intention to take the sticks from him and continue into the mine row and conduct his marking. 
The victim insisted that he help the International Supervisor with carrying the sticks into the 
mine rows and assist him with the marking. The International Supervisor then agreed and he 
and the victim entered the mine row and commenced marking. 
 
They had been in the lane for less than 10 minutes conducting marking, when the victim with 
a club hammer in his hand was bending down to pick up a marking stick. It was at this time 
that he stepped on a PMA-3 blast mine in what he thought to be the 10cm safety overlap. 
 
According to the marking that was in place at the time of the accident this mine was just on 
the outside of the cleared area. There was mine marking tape fixed to the top of the danger 
sticks, however there was not any marking tape at the bottom of the sticks in the vicinity of the 
mine. The victim’s foot must have only caught the very outside edge of the mine. The 
resultant blast caused injuries to the victim’s face, chest, right arm and right foot.  
 
As a consequence of the explosion the hammer was forced into the victim’s chest causing 
bruising, and he then dropped the hammer [the photograph below shows a small hand axe, 
not a hammer: the red handled knife marks the crater].  
  
 
The hammer has then fallen outside the marked area. The International Supervisor was 
standing approximately 2 metres from the victim, and facing in the opposite direction. The 
International Supervisor did not see the actual explosion or receive any injuries from the blast. 
Immediately after the explosion he moved to assist the victim and calm him. As the 
International Supervisor did not realise the victim had received injuries to his foot he 
attempted to guide him out of the lane and onto the road approximately 35 metres away. The 
victim was unable to walk and therefore the International Supervisor called to the SL to bring 
a stretcher to his site. The International Supervisor then called the demining NGO base and 
reported the accident and requested a helicopter casevac. When the SL arrived both he and 
the International Supervisor carried the victim out to the road on the stretcher where the 
medical team was waiting to provide first aid. 
The victim was stabilised and from there he was then taken by ambulance to the HLS located 
approximately 1.5 km to the south. Further treatment was provided at the HLS whilst awaiting 
the arrival of the casevac helicopter. The helicopter arrived at 13:47 which was 50 minutes 
after the request for the helicopter was made and almost 60 minutes after the accident. The 
photograph below shows the victim in hospital on the day after the accident. The victim was 
conscious and able to talk whilst awaiting the arrival of the helicopter. 
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Work History of the victim 
The victim has been working for the demining NGO as a deminer since May 2000. 
 
History of the Area 
The accident site is Task Dossier W02 – 37, at minefield number 358.  The minefields in this 
task dossier are all in the Rasa Koshare area, which is on the Kosovo – Albanian border.  
There was heavy fighting in this location during the war and there are numerous minefields 
along this border area.  The majority of these minefields contain PMR-2 AP fragmentation 
mines with PMA-3 AP blast mines as keepers. 
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
The Task Dossier No W02-37 was issued to the demining NGO on 17 February 2001. 
 
Geography and Weather 
The area in general is the Kosovo – Albanian Border approximately 25km NW from Gjakova.  
The border region around this area is mountainous and covered with forest and bush.  The 
road access to this site is through the village of Junik.  The route from here is a 12km uneven 
gravel road which winds its’ way up to the minefield. The weather at the time of the accident 
was fine with a temperature of approximately 25 degrees Celsius. 
 
Site Layout and Marking 
The site layout and marking at the site was in accordance with the demining NGO SOPs for 
mine-clearance, however the width of the lane was less than that prescribed in the SOPs.  
According to the VJ record this particular minefield has two mine rows which contain clusters 
of mines which contain one PMR-2 AP fragmentation mine with two PMA-3 AP blast mines as 
keepers. These mine rows have been laid in dense bush and trees. 
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
The International supervisor for the site has a National section leader. Managing all the 
demining NGO clearance operations is the Operations Officer. 
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
The demining NGO Quality Control is achieved through a system of on-site checks by the 
Section Leaders and Team Leaders to ensure adherence to the mine-clearance SOPs.  The 
MACC QA teams conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, normally each site is 
visited a minimum of once per week. 
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Communications and Reporting 
At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held Motorola 
radios between the International Supervisor and his Section Leader on their internal net. 
There was further communication by hand-held VHF radios from the team site, and the 
demining NGO base situated in Hereq also on the demining NGO’s internal net.   
At the time of the accident the MACC QA Officer was in the region and monitored all radio 
traffic concerning the accident on the MNB (W) channel.  There were no communications 
problems between any of the above callsigns during the period of the accident. 
 
Medical Details 
The victim received blast injuries to his face and eyes.  He also received injuries to his chest 
and right arm and he has broken toes on his right foot.  Annex D details the medical report 
from the MACC QA Medical Officer. [Annexes not made available.] 
 
Personnel 
A list of personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex D to the demining NGO’s Preliminary 
Investigation Report. Written statements from the personnel involved in the accident form the 
Appendices to this Annex. 
 
Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
At the time of the accident the victim was not wearing personal protective equipment, which 
contravenes the demining NGO SOPs. 
 
Tools and Equipment  
The victim had a club hammer [axe] in his right hand at the time of the accident as he bent 
down to pick up a marking stick. However the accident was caused by the victim placing his 
right foot outside the cleared lane and not through the use of any tools or pieces of 
equipment. 
 
Account of Activities 
The following is a description of the events before and after the accident. The information 
from the investigation forms the basis of the description of events: 
Wednesday 30 May 2001 
12:40 – The International Supervisor calls by radio to the Survey SL to provide marking sticks 
for his site.  The victim is sent by the SL to assist. 
12:50 – The victim stands on PMA-3 whilst conducting marking, The International Supervisor 
is the first person to provide assistance.  He calls the SL to come to his lane and assist, and 
they then carry the victim out of the lane onto the road where the team medics are waiting to 
provide first aid.  The accident is reported to the demining NGO base. 
12:55 – Radio call to senior partner reporting the accident detail. 
12:57 – Radio call to KFOR, MNB (W) and reports that there is a mine accident at this 
location.  [They request the grid reference and there is some confusion over callsigns.] 
Confirmation that they need a helicopter and that there is 1 casualty with a foot amputation. 
Kilo Foxtrot confirms that they will send a helicopter, and they then ask for the name of the 
injured person.  Demining group gives the name of the injured deminer and that his injuries 
are to the face and his eyes. Kilo Foxtrot than requests the name of the Medic TL and medic 
on site that will accompany the casualty on the helicopter. This information is given. 
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Kilo Foxtrot then asks if they would like the casualty to go to the Italian Field Hospital in Peja 
or to a hospital in Pristina.  They replies that they want the casualty to go to the Italian Field 
Hospital in Peja and reconfirms the HLS. Kilo Foxtrot replies that the helicopter will arrive in 
30 minutes (present time 13:04).  They ask Kilo Foxtrot if there is any further information 
required.  Kilo Foxtrot replies that there isn’t at present, but will call again soon. 
13:05 – confirmation that the hospital that the casualty will go to is the Italian Field Hospital in 
Peja. 
13:07– Kilo Foxtrot asks what are the injuries to the casualty. They reply that the injuries are 
to the face and eyes.  Kilo Foxtrot tries to ascertain if there are injuries to the head.  They 
reply that the injuries are to the eyes.  Kilo Foxtrot reconfirms the hospital as the Italian Field 
Hospital in Peja. 
13: 09 – Kilo Foxtrot requests that they be informed when the helicopter arrives at the HLS 
and when it departs. 
13:11 – Kilo Foxtrot reconfirms that the medical team will accompany the casualty on the 
helicopter to the hospital. 
13:47 – They call Kilo Foxtrot and inform that the helicopter has arrived at the HLS. 
13:49 – They call Kilo Foxtrot and inform that the helicopter has departed the HLS with the 
casualty and medical team. 
13:55 – The helicopter arrives at the Italian Field Hospital in Peja. 
 
Insurance Details 
The victim is covered by the demining NGO personal insurance it has for all staff.  All 
insurance policies for the demining NGO are through Willis Insurance Group of London.  A 
copy of the insurance detail is kept in the MACC QA Office. 
 
Conclusions 
Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
As part of the demining NGO strategy for clearance of the numerous minefields in the 
Koshare Task Dossier W02 – 37, the survey team is employed to locate the minefields and to 
then identify the actual mine rows.  This allows the manual clearance teams to commence 
clearance immediately on the mine rows. 
The Operations Officer assessed the Eastern side of the road that bisects minefield 358 as 
being difficult and therefore tasked the International Supervisor to locate these two mine rows 
and identify the pattern of mines. 
The International Supervisor was the only person to have worked on the eastern side of the 
minefield and up until the accident the only person to have walked in this area. 
The method that was employed by the International Supervisor to conduct this survey was not 
in accordance with the demining NGO’s SOPs or to a recognised standard.  He did not use a 
base stick during clearance. The width of the lane was less than 100cm and did not have the 
10cm safety overlap on either side of the lane. Therefore the standard of clearance was 
questionable and not consistent along the complete length of the lane.  
The victim should not have been permitted to enter this lane. He was not aware of the method 
used for clearance and therefore assumed the standard to be that as for normal clearance on 
a the demining NGO minefield site. 
The victim was conducting marking without wearing personal safety equipment. Whilst 
bending down to pick up a marking stick, the victim placed his right foot on the very edge of 
the clearance lane which should have been within the 10cm safety overlap and detonated a 
PMA-3 blast mine. 
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Had the victim been wearing his personal protective equipment at the time of the accident 
then the injuries to his face and chest would have been greatly reduced.  As he did not step 
directly on top of the mine, the injury to his right foot was comparatively insignificant. The 
victim was very lucky not to have suffered more severe injuries than he did. 
The first aid provided to the victim after the accident was swift and to a high standard. 
KFOR had the helicopter on site at the HLS 50 minutes after being notified. 
 
Recommendations 
The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
The area on the eastern side of the road where the International Supervisor conducted his 
survey task is to be considered uncleared and is to be completely recleared in accordance 
with the demining NGO SOPs. 
The clearance drill carried out by the International Supervisor is considered to be a serious 
breach of the demining NGO SOPs as well as recognised International mine-clearance 
standards. It is certainly not what is expected of an International Supervisor. Therefore it is 
recommended that the demining NGO management take the appropriate disciplinary action 
against the International Supervisor for not adhering to the demining NGO SOPs, and for 
placing a deminer in a dangerous situation by allowing him to enter a questionably cleared 
area without personal safety equipment. 
All future survey tasks conducted by the demining NGO are to be in accordance with their in 
country accredited SOPs and recognised standards. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, Quality Assurance Officer 
 
Annexes: [not made available.] 
A. MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry. 
B. Map of the general area. 
C. Schematic diagram of the general accident area. 
D. Medical report from the MACC QA Officer. 
Attachment: the demining NGO Preliminary Investigation Report 
 
Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer 
Whilst the demining NGO have had a number of accidents recently, it has been the findings of 
the Board of Inquiry that they were “genuine accidents”, largely attributable to the extremely 
heavily mine contaminated area they are working in and to the continually changing and 
difficult topography. This accident was clearly preventable and should not have occurred in an 
organisation with an established character of professionalism using effective SOPs. 
Fortunately the casualty suffered only superficial injuries and will experience no long-term 
incapacitation. This may be considered extremely lucky and in no way should detract from the 
seriousness of the circumstances causing this accident. 
The demining NGO have extremely well thought out and effective SOPs and their utilisation 
will serve to mitigate any further accidents. 
The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry are fully endorsed and are to 
be implemented immediately. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, Chief of Operations  
 
Comments by the MACC Programme Manager 
The conclusions and recommendations of this BOI, along with comments by the Chief of 
Operations are completely concurred with.  
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, Programme Manager 
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 Victim Report 
Victim number: 407 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 5 minutes 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: none 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The following medical reports are edited for anonymity only. 
Medical report concerning Rasa Koshare accident 30/05/01 12.55 PM. 
This report is based on interviews/statements of the following staff member of the demining 
NGO involved: 
• Medical Coordinator . 
• Medical Team Leader of the Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team. 
• Medic of the Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team. 
• Medical Team Leader of Rrasa Koshare III Medical Team. 
• Ambulance driver of Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team. 
• Chief Surgeon Italian Field Hospital Peja. 
The victim was born in 1980. 
 
Injuries:  
Internal fracture of right foot. 
Several burn wounds of front surface right leg, front surface of chest, front surface of neck 
and face. (including eyes, nose & lips). 
Surgical procedures carried out at Italian KFOR Hospital Peja. 
• Cleaning and treating the burn wounds. 
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• Assessment of the eye injuries and the level of damage. 
Attachments: 
• Accident report by Medical Coordinator. 
• The sequence of events, by Medical Coordinator. 
• Medical report of Italian KFOR Field Hospital Peja. (It will not be released before the 
victim has been discharged from hospital. 
 
Introduction 
The demining group have been conducting clearance operations in the Koshare mountains 
since March of this year.  On Wednesday 30 May 2001 at approximately 1255hrs a member 
of the  Level Two Survey Team stood on a PMA-3 blast mine in minefield 358 as part of Task 
Dossier W02-37….   
The victim was carried by stretcher to the road where the medics were waiting. They then 
provided the victim with first aid treatment according to the Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support 
concept.  Once he was stabilised the medical team then transported the victim by ambulance 
to the HLS located approximately 1.5km to the south.  Further medical aid was provided to 
the victim whilst awaiting the helicopter.   Once the helicopter arrived he was then 
CASEVACED to the Italian Field Hospital in Peja. The  “On Scene Time” was approximately 
60 minutes, which goes very well with the rule of the “Golden Hour”. 
 
The below mentioned assessment/therapy was carried out at the scene of accident: 
 
Primary survey:  
Glasgow Coma Scale 4-6-5 =15 
Airways: Intact and open. 
Breathing Respiratory pattern and rate within the normal rate. 
Circulation: Blood pressure/pulse rate within the normal rate/limits. The bleeding was 
assessed as not being extensive and controlled by the application of compressive dressings. 
The burn wounds were assessed and then treated by covering with paraffin gauzes. 
Disability: A cervical collar “Stiffneck” was applied after manual stabilization of head/neck. 
 
Second Survey: 
Therapy at the scene of accident: 
IV line*2 (Both arms) 18 gauge. 
500 ml Ringer solution*2 Infusion. 
Oxygen therapy via face mask with reservoir 15 l/min. 
10 mg of morphine IV was administrated. 
One additional doses of 10mg Morphine was administrated due to more pain. 
 
Conclusions 
CASEVAC was performed according to S.O.P 
“On Scene Time” within one hour. 
The treatment/assessment that the victim received by the medical team at the scene of 




If possible use IV canula with minimum size of 16 gauge to all trauma patients. 
When working in remote areas and the estimated “On Scene Time” is going to exceed more 
than one hour, the patient should be evacuated by helicopter. 
Signed: Quality Assurance Medical Officer, UNMIK MACC Kosovo  
 
Demining NGO Accident Report 
The following accident report was created by the demining NGO’s Medical Coordinator on the 
basis of interviews with the following persons involved in the medical part of CASEVAC as of 
30/05/01(in timely order): 
      1. Medical Team Leader of the Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team 
      2. Medic of the Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team 
      3. Medical Team Leader of Rrasa Koshare III Medical Team 
      4. Ambulance driver of Rrasa Koshare VI Medical Team 
      5. Demining Supervisor 
      6. Section Leader 
      7. The Italian KFOR Hospital Surgeon responsible for the hospital treatment 
 
Accident details 
Accident location: Rrasa Koshare VI 
Accident date: 30/05/2001 
Accident time: approximately 12.55 
Medical Team Response Time: approximately 01 minutes 
Persons involved: 
            1.Victim: DOB 1980; Deminer 
            2.Section Leader  
            3.Demining Supervisor 
            4.Medical Team Leader 
             5.Medic 
             6.Medical Team Leader 
             7.Ambulance driver 
 Timing: 
Stabilization Phase Time: approximately 15 minutes 
Transporting time: from calling of Helicopter to arrival in KFOR Hospital 
approximately 47 minutes 
Arrival Time to Italian KFOR Hospital in Peja: 13.55 
Overall CASEVAC time: approximately 60 minutes 
Patient’s Destination: Italian Military KFOR Hospital Peja 
Receiving Doctor’s Name: [omitted] 
Surgical Procedures: 
                       Cleaning and treating the burn wounds. 
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                       Assessment of eyes injures and level of damaging.  
 
Assessment and treatment processes description 
Primary survey: 
The patient was conscious and responsive in full and logical verbal contact, 
Airways intact and open, 
Respiratory pattern and rate, pulse rate and blood pressure within normal limits, 
Stiffneck collar was applied after manual stabilization of the head, 
The bleeding was assessed as not extensive and was controlled by application of the 
compressive dressing. 
The burn wounds were assessed and treated by covering with paraffin gauzes.  
 
Secondary survey: 
Wounds description   
Internal fracture of right foot. 
Several burn wounds of the frontal surface of right leg; frontal surface of chest; frontal surface 
of neck and face (including: eyes; nose and lips). 
 
Therapy 
1000 ml Nacl 0.9% 
100% oxygen via face mask with reservoir-oxygen flow: 15l/min., 
Stiffneck collar applied 
Drugs: 
10mg Morphine i.v 
Followed en-route by additional 10mg Morphine i.v. approximately 10 minutes after first dose. 
 
Accident Chart 
Filled by the MTL and handed over to the Surgeon (the signed copy is in the possession of 
the Medical Coordinator). 
Signed: Medical Coordinator                                                   Date: 31/05/2001 
 
The sequence of events 
1. The ambulance with the medics and pre-hospital trauma care equipment was called 
approximately 12.55 by Demining Supervisor that was next to the injured deminer 
and arrived to the base lane approximately 01 minutes thereafter. 
2. The Medical Team Leader assessed the victim, stopped the bleeding, treated the 
burn wounds and since the vital signs were stable performed a secondary survey, 
wound care and therapy. The Medical Team Leader decided to call KFOR Helicopter. 
3. The base location was informed about the details of the accident on the radio by the 
Demining Supervisor and subsequently contacted Italian KFOR requesting the 
notification of the sending Helicopter and receiving hospital.                                                               
      4.    At the same time as Medical Coordinator I went to KFOR Military Hospital in Peja 
and was there when the Helicopter landed in hospital approx.13.55.    
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5. The Helicopter arrived to the hospital approx.13.55 and the casualty was immediately 
admitted and assessed by Dr. [name omitted]. Upon completion of the detailed 
assessment the treatment was carried out in Italian KFOR Hospital. 
 
Communication description  
Demining Supervisor with Medical Team Leader – effective 
Demining Supervisor with base location  – effective 
Base location with group – effective 
Group with KFOR – effective 
Signed: Medical Coordinator 
In December 2001, the MACC reported that the victim was partially blind in his left eye. He 
had been sent to Denmark for surgical treatment on his eyes and was then undergoing 
rehabilitation in Kosovo. At that time he was still employed by the demining group. 
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field Control Inadequacy” because the 
victim acted on instruction from the senior supervisor in the field and those instructions were 
in direct breach of basic safety SOPs. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” 
because the Field supervisor responsible for putting the victim at risk was a senior ex-pat 
specialist appointed by management. Management must take responsibility for his selection 
and training, which seems to have been inadequate. 
As with most reports from the Kosovo MACC, the accident report demonstrates an unusually 
thorough and critical approach to accident investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination 
Centre that carried out the investigation was not engaged in demining, and this may (in part) 
explain the unusually objective nature of their investigations. 
 
Related papers 
Sample BOI convening papers. 
NO 006/2001 DATED 30 MAY 2001 
 
CONVENING ORDER FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY. 
 
6. The Programme Manager of the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre hereby appoints the 
following members to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the Mine Accident that 
occurred on Wednesday 30 May 2001: 
a. President - MACC QA Officer, 
b. Member - MACC QA Medical Officer, 
c. Member - MACC QA Assistant 
7. The Board of Inquiry is to carry out a full investigation and provide a written report to 
the MACC Programme Manager by 0800hrs Thursday 7 June 2001. The report is to 
be written in the English language. 
8. The Report of the Board of Inquiry is to consider the details attached at Appendix 1 to 
this Annex. 
9. The Board of Inquiry is to issue an information bulletin to members of the mine/UXO 
clearance community in Kosova, to inform them of the accident and any relevant 
information and actions that should be taken by them immediately. 
 
Programme Manager, UN MACC, 30 May 2001 
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 APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX A 
NO 006/2001 DATED 30 MAY 2001 
 
CONTENTS OF REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY 
 
The Report of the Board of Inquiry is to consider the details below: 
1. Introduction. 
2. Sequence Documentation and Procedures of Tasking. 
3. Geography and Weather. 
4. Priority of Task. 
5. Site Layout and Marking. 
6. Management, Supervision and Discipline on site. 
7. Quality Assurance and Quality Control. 
8. Communications and Reporting. 
9. Medical, including injuries sustained. 
10. Personalities, Team Identity No’s and Interviews. 
11. Equipment and Tools. 
12. Details of the Mine/UXO involved. 
13. Evidence of re-mining. 
14. Dress and Personal Protective Equipment. 
15. Use of Dogs. 
16. Use of Machines. 
17. Particulars of Deminers Insurance. 
18. Detailed account of the activities on the day of the accident. 
19. Summary. 
20. Conclusion. 
21. Recommendations. 
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